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The management audit as a tool
to foster corporate governance:
an inquiry in Switzerland
Nathalie Brender and Bledi Yzeiraj
Haute école de gestion de Genève, Carouge, Switzerland, and
Emmanuel Fragniere
School of Management, University of Bath, Bath, UK
Abstract
Purpose – This paper aims to investigate management auditing, a thorough examination of an
organization and the management in place, through an empirical research to gather data about how
management audits are perceived and implemented among Geneva’s (Switzerland) business
community. The board of directors is in charge of a corporation’s overall supervision. The internal
auditing function works under the aegis of the board to ensure that the directors will properly
execute their responsibilities as de!ned by corporate governance rules. Management auditing
could thus be used to improve corporation performance. However, management audits are not
commonly used or referred to as a tool to address corporate governance. Findings enable the
authors to both explain why management audits are not commonly used or referred to as a tool to
address corporate governance and generate related research hypotheses.
Design/methodology/approach – In this paper, the authors rely on an ethnographic study aimed
at exploring perceptions of management audits in service companies from the Geneva region. This
study is based on transcripts from 85 semi-directed interviews, conducted over a three-year period,
of professionals with managerial and auditing backgrounds. The economic context during these
three years was consistently characterized by the Swiss and international !nancial crises, ensuring
that the !ndings remain comparable over this time period.
Findings – This paper identi!ed three main factors that in"uence the integration of management
audits into corporate practices: the degree of acceptance of the tools and requirements of
management audits, the national culture and values embodied in the practice and the degree of
corporate governance maturity. This paper presents the !ndings in the form of hypotheses that can
be tested on any adoption of good corporate governance practices – not on management audits
alone.
Research limitations/implications – Notwithstanding the limitations due to its nature and
extent, this study’s main limitation is its lack of validation of the hypotheses. In further research,
the authors intend to use a quantitative survey to validate the research hypotheses and make
statistical inferences.
Originality/value – This paper contributes to the literature because it is, to the authors’
knowledge, the !rst study to empirically examine the signi!cant link between management audits
and corporate governance. The !ndings could be interesting for an international audience because
they indicate possible action points that boards of directors can leverage to carry out management
audits. The !ndings also bridge a gap between the literature on management audits and the
expanding role of the internal audit function. This study also examines the way companies – in the
The authors are thankful for the valuable suggestions made by Florian Dupuy in this version of
this paper.
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:
www.emeraldinsight.com/0268-6902.htm
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Swiss context – understand, perceive and may be ready to apply management audits as a good
corporate governance practice.
Keywords Corporate governance, Ethnomethodology, Internal audit, Management audit,
Management, Management skills, Business culture, Swiss-based enterprises
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Recent developments in corporate governance have focused largely on compliance with
new legislation and rules, as well as the responsibilities of companies’ management and
boards of directors. This has promoted the development of compliance and corporate
governance audits in addition to regulatory, !nancial and internal audits. The 2010
Institute of Internal Auditors’ (IIA) global internal audit survey showed that the top
three audit activities performed in 2010 were related to operations, compliance and
!nancial risks and that corporate governance reviews were expected to increase
signi!cantly (IIA, 2011).
While corporate governance and compliance audits are regularly performed at a
company level, and individual employee performance reviews at a management level, it
appears that examining the performance of management as a team with respect to a
company’s strategy is only very seldom done. The 2010 National Association of
Corporate Directors (NACD) Public Company Survey emphasized the rise of board,
committee and director evaluations, but it did not mention management evaluations,
which are often limited to individual performance evaluations. Furthermore, the
majority of these tend to be self-evaluations, as they are routinely conducted by the
evaluated board, committee or directors themselves (NACD, 2010).
Corporate governance reviews have generally consisted of checking whether the
procedures, tools and means for achieving a strategy are working effectively at an
operational level, thus leaving aside such important management decisions as market
positioning and development and allocation of critical resources. However, the board of
directors is ultimately responsible for these management decisions and actions. The
study of these decisions, and whether they contribute to the realization of a company’s
strategy or are additional sources of !rm risk, is often neglected, and corrective actions
are also missing. For example, the Royal Bank of Scotland failure was attributable to
poor management decisions. Consequently, the British Financial Services Authority
outlined several underlying de!ciencies in the banking culture, management’s
capabilities and style and the overall governance arrangements (FSA, 2011).
A management audit seeks to evaluate whether a company has a suitable
organization and appropriate management team in place to achieve its objectives. It
focuses on strategic objectives and enables a company to adapt its key human resources
to the changing business environment. It not only includes a review of strategy and how
it is being implemented but it also involves an evaluation of the pro!le and competencies
(hard and soft skills) of the management teams. A well-conducted management audit
uses qualitative criteria to analyze whether management can effectively achieve a
company’s strategy and to evaluate management’s composition, skills and attitudes
(Craig-Cooper and De Backer, 1993a).
The scope of the management audit is to evaluate whether the organization has
implemented the right and adequate tools for achieving its strategy rather than simply
checking that these tools are effectively working at an operational level (Lewington,
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1991), thus sometimes questioning the company’s strategic course and all the attendant
goals set for it. Management audits can, therefore, contribute to explaining past
mistakes, but, more importantly, they can also serve as anticipatory measures to
provide the board of directors with guarantees about timely and accurate completion of
action plans. Finally, management audits are designed to be both prospective and
continuous tools for improving management skills and capabilities. They should, thus,
become integral instruments of corporate governance for organizational self-re"ection
and change. This context of controversy over the requirements for good governance in
relation to the quality of management leads to our research question (RQ):
RQ1. Why are management audits not commonly used or referred to as a tool to
address corporate governance?
The purpose of this paper is to investigate how management audits are perceived and
how they are being used and implemented among the Geneva (Switzerland) region’s
business community. Our study is based on 85 semi-directed interviews of professionals
withmanagerial and auditing backgrounds,mostly activewithin the service industry in
the Geneva area, and those who were enrolled in the EMBA program at the Hautes
Etudes Commerciales (HEC) University of Geneva during 2008, 2009 and 2010. We
apply an ethnomethodological approach to study howmanagement audits are perceived
within the Geneva community. We identify three primary reasons why management
audits have not been more widely used:
(1) the degree of acceptance of the tools and requirements of management audits;
(2) the national culture and the values embodied in the practice; and
(3) the degree of maturity of corporate governance.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a literature
review, in which we stress the utility of management audits as an effective corporate
governance tool and the conditions for diffusion of this practice with an emphasis on
the role of the internal audit function in the performance ofmanagement audits. Afterwe
present the development of the management audit concept and its utility within the
corporate governance puzzle, Sections 3 and 4 describe our theoretical framework,
research design and methodology. We build on the diffusion of management practices
and innovation literature to capture different drivers or barriers in adopting
management audits as good corporate governance practices. We distinguish among
technical, cultural and political or power-related factors to make sense from an
ethnomethodological perspective. Section 5 then presents the results of our research
using the four open questions of the original questionnaire as an outline.We discuss our
!ndings in relation to the relevant literature and theoretical framework in Section 6 and
expose them under the form of hypotheses that can be tested over any good corporate
practice adoption by an organization and not on management audits alone. The !nal
section provides our conclusions, the main contributions of our work and related
limitations, eventually suggesting potential areas for future research.
2. Literature review
2.1 Management audit as a corporate governance tool
Interest in the concept of corporate governance has grown considerably over the past 10
years, in both academic and professional literature. This is mainly attributable to
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scandals such as Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat, the subprime mortgage crisis and the
ongoing global !nancial crisis. They were caused bymanagerial fraud, misconduct and
negligence that resulted in loss of shareholder wealth (Baker, 2010). The goal of
improving corporate governance to avoid such catastrophes has been invoked as a
justi!cation for the fast-growing regulatory requirements in many areas. For example,
consider the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in the USA, which intensi!ed
control activities in companies, and the development of the Basel III framework in
response to the 2008 !nancial crisis.
There is no consensus on the de!nition of corporate governance in the literature, and
the IIA position paper on corporate governance outlines the most common and
important elements. The IIA, thus, describes corporate governance as a set of “policies,
processes, and structures used by the organization to direct and control its activities,
achieve its objectives, and protect the interests of its diverse stakeholder groups […]”
(IIA, 2006, p. 4). To protect stakeholder interests, and particularly shareholder interests,
corporate governance strives to separate and balance power between the executive
function (management), the supervision function (board of directors) and the sovereign
function (shareholders who express themselves mainly during the General Assembly)
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). The concept of corporate governance has progressively been
enlarged to encompass the protection of other stakeholder interests, such as customers,
employees, suppliers and public authorities (Freeman, 1984). In that sense, it constitutes
a set of rules to manage the relationships among the shareholders, management and
board of an organization, as well as in relation to other stakeholders, as per the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) de!nition (OECD,
2004).
Moreover, corporate governance is often linked with the quality of the !nancial
reporting system or the design and implementation of an internal control system
(Wright, 1996; Beasley et al., 2000) and even to the setup of a risk management
committee (Brown et al., 2009). Shifts in different national legislations have required that
boards of directors have increased oversight over companies’ internal control systems –
for example, by having external auditors perform annual reviews of a !rm’s internal
controls. In Germany and the USA, corporate governance regulations require an annual
audit of internal control systems for listed companies and public companies,
respectively. This evolution has fostered the development of compliance and corporate
governance audits, which has led to complaints over the additional costs of these
practices (Sneller and Langendijk, 2007).
The board of directors is the key player in corporate governance activities (Brown
et al., 2009) and in charge of overall supervision of the corporation. Internal auditing
provides the board with a reasonable assurance on risk management and compliance to
regulations and internal procedures. The board usually delegates its oversight
responsibilities in the areas of internal control, !nancial reporting, risk assessment and
compliance to committees such as the audit committee. To ful!ll these duties, the audit
committee seeks expertise and relies on thework performed by the internal and external
audit functions (Rezaee, 2010). External audits are generally conducted by auditing
!rms, which are often seen as being in competition with the internal audit function.
However, recent developments have sought to promote more cooperation between
internal and external auditors to improve risk control and compliance (Johl et al., 2013).
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For example, SOX prescribes that external and internal audit teams cooperate under the
direction of the audit committee (Balkaran, 2008).
Proceeding to management audits is within the scope of action of the corporate
governance mission of the board of directors. Management audits can reduce the
principal-agency problem and offer an additional and essential guarantee of the quality
of corporate governance to the board of directors, which is usually linked to strong
!nancial performance and internal controls. As thorough examinations of the
organization and the management are in place, they could thus be used to aid in
improving corporation performance (Dann et al., 2002).
Advocates of management audits have emerged in the private sector, and
practitioners have performed such audits over the past 10 years. For example, the
British Financial Services Authority also audited the management in the case of
the failure of the Bank of Scotland. However, the contribution of management audits to
the quality of corporate governance by reducing the principal-agency problem and
strengthening !nancial performance and internal controls has remained understudied.
In particular, academic research on management audits as a corporate governance tool
remains scant. Existing literature on management audits has focused on their practice
since it !rst appeared during the 1930s, but it has become somewhat fragmented over
time and, currently, does not systematically relate management audits to corporate
governance requirements.
Management audit was de!ned as “[…] an evaluation of management and the
organization’s functioning and performance with respect to economy, ef!ciency, and
effectiveness of operating areas, activities, and results” (Parker and Foundation, 1986,
cited in Burrowes and Persson, 2000, p. 89) to move to:
[…] one technique that can be used to manage change effectively and contributes to the
ef!ciency of boards and executive teams. It provides an in-depth appraisal of a company, and,
more importantly, an evaluation of themanagement team, including individual assessments of
each executive and how well these match the company’s strategy (Craig-Cooper and De
Backer, 1993c, cover page).
While management audits indeed focus on the effectiveness and the ef!ciency of
management and how they perform overall as a team (Craig-Cooper and De Backer,
1993b; Innes and Lyon, 1994; Parker and Foundation, 1986), they also contribute to
fostering corporate governance, in particular the board’s effectiveness in ful!lling
its strategy mission by bringing the organization toward its objectives. Calls for
management audits date back to 1932 in the UK (Rose, 1944). Since then, several
British (Baden, 1968; Bishop, 1974; Craig-Cooper and De Backer, 1993c; Glynn, 1987)
and American (Benedict, 1948; Robertson and Clarke, 1971; Burton and Fair!eld,
1982) authors have further developed proposals on how to perform such audits.
Management audits in the public sector were !rst referred to as value for money
audits in Australia and performance audits in the USA. The practice later spread to
the private sector, where, for example, the 1975 Swedish Companies Act mandated
that Swedish companies audit boards of directors and managing directors
(Burrowes and Persson, 2000).
The development of management audits in the private sector was mainly motivated
by the desire to avoid the principal-agency problem, thus enhancing corporate
governance. The way shareholders monitor and evaluate management behavior and
accountability then became important for good governance (Fama, 1980). The audit
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function has also done a great deal to reassure shareholders and stakeholders globally
about how !rms control the operational risks related to !nancial reporting and control
systems (Kirkpatrick, 2009). However, several authors have argued that focusing on
operational risk and!nancial information to evaluatemanagement performance and, by
extension, an organization’s performance can be insuf!cient to reduce the information
asymmetry between management and shareholders (Richardson, 2000; Banker et al.,
2000). For example, Innes andLyon (1994) argued that the audit function should domore
to ensure long-term management performance. They studied the impact of external
management audits (de!ned as independent examinations of an organization resulting
in a statement to external users on the performance of the management function) on
lending decisions made by external fund providers, and it showed a positive correlation
between the results of such audits and the allocation and the conditions of the funds
granted. From an investor’s viewpoint, this is an important issue. Investors ultimately
use the results of external management audits as an assurance about management
functions such as !nance, marketing and production before making their investment
decisions (Innes, 1990). Assessing the quality of the performance of management not
only requires the use of qualitative non-!nancial indicators but also the integration of
these indicators in the management decision-making process itself. For example,
Govindarajan (1989) argued that management styles and experiences could be directly
related to the success of a strategy. He concluded that superior performance can be
achieved by selecting managers whose skills, knowledge and behaviors are congruent
with a given strategy. When it comes to strategy, the data required to assess the
successful management controls should be concerned more with competitive
benchmark and non-!nancial performance measures, as strategic management is
future-oriented and is not amenable to control by traditional measures such as budget
and pro!t targets (Goold and Quinn, 1990). Accordingly, Eccles and Pyburn (1992)
criticized the rigid nature and the concentration of the !nancial information as key
indicators and indicated that management requires broader measurements to make
informed decisions. Even the introduction of the balanced score card by Kaplan and
Norton (1996), which was !rst a reaction to ineffective and dysfunctional management
information, wasmeant to serve as a tool going beyond the strict production of !nancial
indicators that should be used as an informing and learning system rather than a system
that strives to evaluate past performance.
2.2 Management audit as internal audit activity
Corporate governance provides the set of rules that will govern the corporation’s
activities and the relationships between its stakeholders. The board of directors is the
guardian of corporate governance and, in particular, of the !rm’s supervision function,
and the internal audit function works under its aegis to ensure that the board properly
executes its responsibilities as de!ned by corporate governance rules. While
professional bodies and associations generally advocate for expanding the internal
audit function to include corporate governance assessment, in practice, over the past 10
years, internal auditors have remained involved at a mostly operational level (Power,
2005; PwC, 2014).
Management auditing is one of the practices that could allow the internal audit
function to play a more proactive and strategic role within the current corporate
governance context, thus contributing to improving corporation performance as it:
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[…] moves up a level to address control issues arising from managing an activity. It involves
an appreciation of the !ner points relating to the various managerial processes that move the
organization towards its objectives (Pickett and Pickett, 2010, p. 12).
By providing assurance or consulting on various matters relating to the supervision
function of the board, such as risk management, control and governance, the audit
function, and the internal audit function in particular, has become one of the key
cornerstones of effective corporate governance (IIA, 2006). Taken together, both the
internal and external audit functions are part of the checks and balances that constitute
corporate governance (Wright, 2013), as auditing has even been quali!ed as a distinctive
idea or model of governance itself (Power, 2002).
To recognize the changing role of the internal audit function in contemporary
organizations and its expanded scope into risk management and corporate governance,
the IIA upgraded the de!nition of the internal audit function in 2004. The internal audit
helps “an organization accomplish its objectives by bringing a systematic, disciplined
approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk management, control, and
governance processes” (IIA, 2004, p. 19). Moreover, the “International Standards for the
Professional Practice of Internal Auditing” (IIA, 2012) are explicit about the role of the
internal auditing function regarding corporate governance matters and the fact that it
should be equipped with suf!cient knowledge, competencies and skills to conduct
related audit missions. This standard highlights the increasing role of internal auditing
function in improving corporate governance, in particular, in ensuring effective
organizational performance management and accountability, as well as promoting
appropriate ethics and values within the organization (IIA, 2012, pp. 3-11).
The internal audit function has extended its scope of action to include risk
management, process ef!ciency and corporate governance missions (Goodwin-Stewart
and Kent, 2006). Internal audit functions have developed practices that have
increasingly taken into account organizational goals and brought added value to
the business. They have entered into a partnering approach with management since the
beginning of the twenty-!rst century, which translated into the implementation of more
preventive, risk-based practices than detective, control-based measures (Hass et al.,
2006; IIA, 1999; Krogstad et al., 1999). The change from a compliance- and
control-oriented model to a risk-management model was a major paradigm shift (Selim
and McNamee, 1998), which expanded the consultative activities of the internal audit.
However, the SOX legislation in the USA and similar laws in other countries reasserted
the importance of assurance activities, in particular compliance works related to these
regulatory regimes. For instance, a PwC survey of audit managers showed that, in 2002,
the internal audit function dedicated, in general, 50 per cent of their resources to
compliance works needed for the !rst year of the SOX implementation (PwC, 2006),
which may have diverted internal audit resources from developing more
strategic-oriented activities.
Internal auditors were expected to develop innovative ways to better interpret
today’s business realities (Joscelyne, 2004). Melville (2003), for instance, suggested that
the internal audit’s involvement in strategic management through the implementation
of balanced scorecards as tools to address and report on non!nancial and qualitative
issues has positive implications for the quality of top management. Furthermore,
Hyland et al. (2003) developed a model that analyzes the potential for value creation of
the internal audit function when it is combined with the human resources function at a
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strategic level. They argued that the application of an audit risk-managing approach
can enhance the creation of value in strategically focused human resources
management. Internal audit has also been mainly associated with risk management
rather than a mechanism of corporate governance (Goodwin-Stewart and Kent, 2006).
Finally, Selim et al. (2003) highlighted the positive contribution of the internal audit
function in collaborating with other functions to the effective deployment of merger and
acquisition strategies.
It seems, then, that the internal audit has a dual functionality, as it should, on the one
hand, assist the board in discharging properly its increasing legal obligations to assure
good corporate governance, and, on the other hand, also help themanagement to achieve
the organization’s objectives, thus responding to the added-value philosophy.
Consequently, the internal audit function has become one of the four cornerstones of
corporate governance, together with the audit committee, the management and the
external auditors (Gramling et al., 2004). From this perspective, current literature
suggests that further research should address the issues arising in the relationships
between these functions, in particular those between the internal auditors and the
management (Joscelyne, 2004; PwC, 2007). The question of the independence of the
internal audit staff in regard to management as a condition for the quality of internal
audits is one of them (San Miguel and Govindarajan, 1984). Furthermore, the overall
management support of the internal audit function is considered an important criterion
in evaluating the internal audit quality (Clark et al., 1981).
As for the future, the role of the internal audit is expected to increase over the next few
years, particularly in strategy development and personnel training (IIA, 2011). The IIA
foresees a strengthening of this function in governance-related activities, including
evaluations of board structures, objectives and dynamics, as well as management
evaluations. According to the Three Lines of Defense model, the internal auditing
function (the third line of defense) provides assurance on the effectiveness of
governance, risk management and internal controls, including the manner in which the
operationalmanagement (!rst line of defense) and the riskmanagement and compliance
functions (second line of defense) achieve risk management and control objectives (IIA,
2013). There are high expectations that internal auditors will take a more proactive role
to help assure good corporate governance. However, the means to reach these
expectations must !rst be clearly de!ned (Leung et al., 2011), as well as the question of
independence of the internal audit function.An internal audit function directly reporting
to the board of directors (IIA, 2013) would be a strong candidate to performmanagement
audits, as it would bene!t both from the independence of action and from an in-depth
knowledge of the company’s business activities and processes compared to external
consultants or external auditors.
In addition, while the internal audit is considered a resource of the audit committee
and the management within the four cornerstones model of corporate governance, the
literature provides little insight on how this resource is being used to satisfy these two
functions. Until now, the internal audit mission has revolved more around mid-level, or
operational, activities. However, board members’ and senior management’s current
expectations toward internal auditors are rising in terms of value added to the business
and advice in strategic activities. In a recent survey (PwC, 2014, p. 10), the internal audit
function is considered to be moving from an “assurance provider” to a “trusted advisor”
that can provide value-added services and proactive strategic advice to the business.
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Particular focus should be put on the revision of practices and techniques to allow
internal auditors to play an increased role in upper-level activities within organizations.
In the light of the above discussion, we argue that management audits could not only
be used to further reduce the agency problem, the main paradigm in today’s accounting
theory (Baker, 2010), but also to foster management performance, in particular, in the
completion of the company’s strategy. In addition, the 2008-2009 !nancial crisis, as well
as the debt crisis, has shown that focusing only on the design and effectiveness of
internal controls, especially over !nancial reporting, may not guarantee ef!cient risk
management or an organization’s long-term health within a framework of good
governance (Kirkpatrick, 2009).
While the majority of audits address !nancial and operational risks, few concentrate
on strategic risks. But protecting shareholders, preserving and creating company value
and developing talent are at the heart of management audits. Thus, these should
be integral parts of a company’s corporate governance strategy because these can
reassure shareholders and stakeholders about an organization’s strength and health by
addressing strategic risks with anticipatory and qualitative measures (Burrowes and
Persson, 2000).
Our literature review reveals that the concept of management audit and its
application within the context of intensifying corporate governance practices has been
understudied. This point shows the interest of our work to contribute to the literature
and its relevance within the corporate governance context. In this paper, we aim to use
empirical evidence to demonstrate howmanagement audits are perceived and how they
are being used and implemented among the Geneva (Switzerland) region’s business
community. This paper also contributes to our understanding of the expanded role of
the internal audit function in strategic activities by performing management audits.
To our knowledge, this paper is the !rst to empirically investigate howmanagement
audits are perceived through managers’ and auditors’ experiences within the context of
the increasing needs of strategic risk management and growing corporate governance
requirements. It aims to unravel the importance of the management audit as a tool to
foster corporate governance and the reasonswhymanagement audits are not commonly
used or referred to as a tool to address corporate governance.
3. Theoretical framework
To address this question, we rely on perceivedmeanings gathered through semi-directed
interviews. Managers and auditors have either experienced management audits,
performed them or at least considered them. In case they have not, we can still collect
relevant information regarding their personal views about the notion of the
management audit. We also aim to identify organizational implications related to the
conduct of management audit missions within corporations.
Our research consists of an exploratory study, which we use to determine how
managers and auditors generally perceive these audits and to obtain indications for
further research. We apply an ethnomethodological approach to describe the social
world of the management audit in the way that the research subjects (managers and
auditors) would explain it. This inductive approach assumes a priori no theoretical
framework. Its main purpose is to generate new research hypotheses. This
methodology is particularly relevant when speci!c scienti!c knowledge is lacking.
Ethnomethodology provides !ndings that correspond to meanings of social
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phenomenon. In our case, the social phenomenon is the fact that corporations do not
commonly conductmanagement audits. As our research question startswith “Why” (i.e.
Why are management audits not commonly used or referred to as a tool to address
corporate governance?), we want to !nd out the meanings explaining this social
phenomenon. As a matter of fact, we concentrate on the sense-making (Heap, 1976)
related to the notion of practice (i.e. in our case,management audits) in an intersubjective
world created among different groups (i.e. in our case, business managers and auditors)
(Gar!nkel, 2008; Gephart, 1993; Benson and Hughes, 1983). We would like to stress the
limited nature of our study and highlight the fact that our !ndings cannot be
extrapolated to all Swiss companies; however, they allowus to devise a stricter andmore
rigorous methodology for further studies based on closed-form questionnaires or
quantitative surveys. Research hypotheses generated by the ethnomethodology
approach can then be validated via statistical inferences.
Ethnomethodology has been chosen as the main research framework for data
collection. Ethnomethodology is a qualitative survey research approach that enables the
researcher to learn about beliefs systems and social codes of a given organization. Data
gathering is mainly realized through interviews and immersions episodes.
Ethnomethodology, as opposed to ethnography, does not make any a priori
theoretical assumptions. This is the main reason why we have used ethnomethodology.
Indeed, in the context of management audit, we wanted to conduct the exploratory
research process without any preconceived theory. Consequently, once the gathered
data have been analyzed, we have been able to propose new research hypotheses. It is
solely afterward that the newly generated hypotheses have been compared to the
existing scienti!c literature.
Our main objective here is to understand the reasons behind the apparent reasons
within companies to conduct these audits. To support the identi!cation and the analysis
of the relevant dimensions that explain the adoption and diffusion of management
auditing, we will use the literature on the diffusion of practices – in particular, the
framework developed by Ansari et al. (2010). We, thus, need a comprehensive frame of
the phenomenon under study to properly conduct appropriate data collection and
address the question in a systematic and rigorous manner. Consequently, this inductive
approach is the most suitable for our research, considering that our objective is to gain
insight into a particular context, to understand it and to interpret it from !eldwork.
A growing body of literature on the diffusion of practices offers considerable insight
into why practices are initially adopted by an organization, both from an economic and
sociological perspective (Sturdy, 2004). On the one hand, the economists consider the
adopters of the practices as rational actors who focus on the presumed bene!ts that
result from the adoption of the given practice. For them, the adoption or the diffusion of
the given practice is positively linkedwith the cost-effectiveness of what is referred to as
innovation in this practice (Rogers, 1995). On the other hand, the sociologists challenge
the adoption of a practice as the result of rational choices and focus more on the
perceptions and the internal dynamic of the adopters. In particular, Sturdy (2004, p. 169)
identi!ed the following explanatory factors in regard to the adoption of a practice and
argued that “adoption is not based on a systematic assessment of solutions to
organizational problems, but on impulse, persuasion, power, cultural resonance, and
legitimation, or is subsumed within them”.
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Building on the technical imperative of the economic perspective and the cultural
imperative of the social perspective, Ansari et al. (2010) analyzed the diffusion process
by focusing on the lack of !t between the characteristics of the practice and the
characteristics of the adopting organizations. Furthermore, these authors used Oliver’s
(1992) categorization of factors in"uencing organizational practices, suggesting three
forms of incompatibilities resulting from technical, cultural and political origins that
could possibly explain the adoption and the adaptation of the practices. According to
Ansari et al.’s (2010) framework, the technical !t relates to the degree to which
characteristics of a practice are compatible with the technologies already in use by
potential adopters. Based on this model, it seems relevant for our purposes to determine
what kinds of skills and tools are speci!cally required for management audits in
comparison to traditional audits (e.g. !nancial audits).
The cultural !t derives from the social perspective that we introduced above and is
concernedwith the cultural values andmeaning structures embodied in the practice, the
organizational culture, values and beliefs and also the supra-organizational factors such
as society-level phenomena. Haxhi et al. (2010), for example, found that national culture
may serve as a comprehensive indicator in explaining the diffusion of good corporate
governance codes. It is, therefore, important, fromour ethnomethodological approach, to
evaluate both the perceived meanings and values of the management audit and the
implications of the Swiss national and business culture in the adoption of this practice.
The third factor, referred to as political !t, deals more with details about how the
balance of power and interests in the adopting organizations is affected by the adoption
of the practice. It has been demonstrated that at different levels of the analysis, agents
with symbolic power are crucial gatekeepers of diffusion (Guillén, 1994; Buchanan and
Badham, 1999). Accordingly, and even more at an organizational level, the formal and
informal power structures, resource dependencies and coalitions in"uence deeply how
practices and new ideas are received by the organization (Fligstein, 1996; Mamman,
2002). As management auditing triggers an interaction of the four cornerstones of the
corporate governance (audit committee, internal audit, external audit andmanagement),
we believe that it is important to analyze how the power structures of these parties affect
the perception of management audits and, therefore, may impact the diffusion (or
absence of diffusion) of audit practices. In addition, we also !nd it interesting to address
this power notion under the multidimensional de!nition of national culture of Hofstede
(1997). His work pertains to the extent to which the less powerful members of
organizations and institutions accept and expect the power to be distributed unequally.
Groups may perceive management audits differently, and, depending on their position
within the organization, they may either challenge or even prevent their realization.
4. Research design and methodology
Our study is based on a work including 85 semi-directed interviews of professionals
withmanagerial and auditing backgrounds,mostly activewithin the service industry in
the Geneva area and those who were enrolled in the EMBA program at the Hautes
Etudes Commerciales (HEC) University of Geneva during 2008, 2009 and 2010 (Figure 2).
The economic context over these three years has remained characterized by the!nancial
crisis in the Swiss and international contexts, ensuring that our !ndings remain
comparable over this time period.
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Figure 1 shows the sector breakdown of the survey participants’ companies. The
largest single majority (34 per cent) came from the banking sector, which is consistent
with the importance of this sector in the Geneva business region. It represents
approximately 19 per cent of Geneva’s gross domestic product (GDP), with a total of 173
banks, including 60 foreign-owned institutions (OCSTAT, 2013). An estimated 40 per
cent of all assets managed in Switzerland are directly or indirectly controlled from
Geneva (Anhorn and Meier, 2012).
The public sector was next, with 19 per cent of participants working mainly for the
Geneva Canton (county) administration, especially in the medical, social and education
administrations. Few came from the federal administration. The Geneva Canton is in
charge of several policy domains as part of the Swiss Confederation, which gives the
majority of power to its components, the cantons. The “Others” section,which also totals
34 per cent, comprised various sectors such as watch-making, media, construction and
pharmaceutical and biotechnology.
Figure 2 gives the breakdown of the participants by profession.We divided them into
three groups, with top-level management representing the highest level of
decision-makers among our participants. This group comprised CFOs, CEOs, general
directors and senior associates.We then classi!ed the participantswith less authority as
Figure 1.
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mid-level management, including unit directors, team leaders and senior managers, as
well as a few junior managers. However, we did not include the risk managers, internal
auditors or external auditors in these classi!cations. Rather, we grouped them
according to their profession without regard to the decision-making level. Based on this
classi!cation, 57 per cent of our participants are part of a management team, while 43
per cent are auditors and risk managers.
After a presentation and discussion of the management audit concept and
framework, the survey participants conducted or responded to a semi-directed
interview. The interviews systematically included the following questions:
Q1. What is your experience with management audits?
Our purpose was to determine whether the participants or their interviewees had been
facedwithmanagement audits in the past and, if so, underwhat circumstances andwith
what consequences:
Q2. For what reasons are management audits performed?
Our purpose was to identify whether management audits are performed in the normal
course of business activities or whether they are conducted only in special
circumstances (e.g. during times of crisis, as part of mergers and acquisitions, as part of
succession planning, etc.). We expected answers to be based on and in"uenced by the
personal perceptions of the respondents. Thus, by asking about the reasons behind a
management audit, we intended to identify the values embodied in the practice and if
these values are compatible with the common beliefs of the participants:
Q3. What are the main characteristics and tools of a management audit?
Our purpose was to determine to what extent our participants consider management
audits to be similar or different from traditional audits, such as operational or !nancial
audits. By doing so, we intended to explore the technical implications that this practice
implies for our participants:
Q4. Who can perform a management audit?
Our purpose was to understand how our participants perceive the requirements for
those conducting a management audit, especially those related to the independence of
the auditor. Thus, by asking our participants about the requirements for those who
perform amanagement audit, we expected to identify the extent to which they recognize
the importance of resource dependencies and the formal or informal power structures in
performing the task properly.
These open questions were designed to provide the participants with enough
freedom to discuss patterns in the audit management framework or to explore
additionalways tomake itmore effective. The interviewsweremostly self-administered
because the participants came from two types of populations (business managers and
auditors) under investigation. Approximately 70 per cent of the participants answered
the questions themselves, with the remaining 30 per cent (all from the manager
population) performing interviews with members of their teams or their superiors.
5. Results
In this section, we provide a synthesis of the data collected (i.e. transcripts of
semi-directed interviews). To simplify the restitution, we use the four open questions as
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an outline, and we illustrate it using actual respondent quotes. All the synthesis work is
based on a thorough analysis of our transcripts database.
5.1 What is your experience with management audits?
The results of the !eldwork among the survey participants and their interviewees show
that most had very little or biased experience with management audits. As a !rst issue,
we observe that managers are not familiar with the notion of management audit, as it is
mostly developed and applied in a North American or Anglo-Saxon context. We also
notice that respondents even associated it with other activities such as individual
performance or team performance reviews, market reviews or governance or internal
audits, which are not management audits.
Moreover, respondents are saying that they believemanagement audits would not be
feasible in Switzerland, where con!dentiality and a strong respect for hierarchy are very
important (for further details, see also Section 5.4, “Who can perform a management
audit?”). For example, some survey participants argued that “management audits are
not applicable to the banking sector” or to strategic sectors in which public
administrations have invested. Even addressing the question of management audit
within a company is seen by respondents as being fraught with signi!cantly negative
career consequences. Management audit is somehow considered to be somewhat futile,
as many respondents note that the control mechanisms in place at companies are
suf!cient.
Finally, even when the notion of management audit seems to be well understood by
our respondents, a certain amount of taboo remains in terms of fear regarding the
potential consequences (e.g. being !red) related to its actual implementation. Indeed,
managers interviewedmost often express respect toward the hierarchy already in place.
They also tend to believe that the auditing professionals, whether internal or external,
would not be suf!ciently experienced or knowledgeable about the industry to evaluate
management capabilities and decisions.
5.2 For what reasons are management audits performed?
Approximately one-fourth of the survey participants believemanagement audits should
be performed only during times of a major change for a company. Only a small
percentage stated that management audits can be useful to help rectify poor managerial
performance or assist a company in remaining on track to reach its objectives.
Another issue is that even the survey participants who concede some business utility
to management audits seem to perceive in them an ulterior motive. For example, they
believe that the real agenda is hidden and may consist of !nding a way to !re the top
manager or the whole managing team. As a chief quality of!cer in the watch-making
industry notes:
[…] a management audit is used to make sure that the strategy is well understood and well
deployed in the whole company. Aswith any type of audit, it should be considered as a tool for
performance improvement […]. Unfortunately, themanagement audit is sometimes performed
on behalf of the board of directors to !re a manager.
Other managers interviewed also believe that management audits are actually a type of
sanction, rather than a method to improve risk management and team effectiveness. A
top manager in the media sector, who believes that there are positive aspects of
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continuous improvement tomanagement audits, highlighted that it is often perceived as
“another control measure which can be totally intrusive in people’s work”.
In addition, survey participants do not seem to perceive the value added of
management audits that are performed during the normal course of business,
particularly when a company is doing well and is not planning to expand or change its
strategy. Thus, management audits are sometimes perceived as a means to solve crises,
but not envisioned as valuable preventative management practices.
Finally, management auditing is not considered applicable to all industries. Some
participants argue that it would be dif!cult to !nd competent, knowledgeable and
independent auditors in some highly specialized industries. Another issue is the need to
preserve con!dentiality. Furthermore, the legal structure of Swiss private banks often
mandates that owners can be held liable with their personal fortunes. Therefore, it is
believed that some companies would not need such audits because of their owners’
signi!cant personal involvement in and control of the company.
Although management audits could help identify mistakes in strategy design and
implementation, thus becoming an important part of the company’s quality
improvement process, they are, for the respondents, synonymous with sources of
trouble for departments, divisions or management. This is the general perception in the
Geneva business area, as our respondents seem to consider management audits as
having punitive consequences and occurring primarily duringmergers and acquisitions
or crises.
5.3 What are the main characteristics and tools of a management audit?
When asked what the respondents perceive as the most important characteristics and
tools of a management audit, they propose designs based more on compliance, !nancial
or internal audits. They do not generally adapt to the speci!cities of management audits
for either objectives or methods. In fact, only a few participants propose internal
observation of the!rm as part of their methodology. Some emphasize the need to rely on
interviews, but few use it as their main audit instrument or re"ect on how the interviews
should be structured and performed.
When explaining how a management audit should be designed, most respondents
describe the organization and preparation of the audit, the !eldwork performance, the
analysis of the !ndings and the reporting of audit results. They also highlight the
importance of these phases in relation to other types of audits. For example, tests of
controls as they are performed in external audits would not be relevant here. In addition,
while survey participants tend to agree that the !rst phase of management audits is
gathering the information necessary for the analysis, particularly documentation about
a !rm’s strategy and organizational structure, they do not explain how they would
obtain this information or why it would be useful. The survey participants focusmainly
on the importance of the collection and the review of the documentation, but they do not
explain how the results would guide their empirical work.
Interviews at this stage are also considered primarily as a way to gather information
(but not as the primary material of an audit). Several participants suggest proposals on
how to conduct them. The most popular ideas are individual formal interviews with
members of topmanagement and directors; some propose 360-degree interviews or even
informal interviews to compare different viewpoints. Only a small group of participants
propose !eld observation of a !rm’s activities.
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Once information has been gathered, it is important to analyze it. However, this is the
most dif!cult part of the entire process, and, as a whole, survey participants failed to
devise an appropriate analysis method. Note that the analysis of the information needs
to clearly re"ect the audit’s objectives, but this point is not systematically stated in the
participants’ work. Therefore, it becomes dif!cult to extract the relevant information to
analyze, such as the consequences of a strategic decision.
Regarding amore strategic approach, most of the participants propose analyzing the
structure and the resources of the !rm to assess whether it is effectively capable of
reaching its strategic objectives. From this perspective, many tools are proposed, such
as the application of the COSO model for evaluating the internal control system or the
SWOTdiagram for presenting the position of the!rm. However, less is done at this level
to push the analysis further or to evaluate the strategy formation process, the de!nition
of objectives and their implementation. According to the survey participants, this
extremely important step seems to be quite dif!cult in highly specialized business
sectors.
For example, assessing the quality of strategy design and implementation at this
level requires in-depth knowledge of a !rm’s activities, the overall industry in which it
operates and the context in which the !rm has evolved. The !rst step may consist of
evaluating whether the !rm’s strategy matches the general expectations of the board of
directors or those of the shareholders. Then, benchmarking with industry practices can
complement this evaluation. A consultant working for a big trust company, interviewed
in the survey, proposes that:
[…] after understanding the business of our clients, their management style, and their
procedures, we seek to benchmark them to best practices issued from work with other clients.
The main goal is not to make them adopt these practices but rather give them a comparison
basis.
It, thus, seems important to obtain a common basis of comparison, illustrated perhaps
by other experiences of similar !rms or organizations, to adequately evaluate a
company’s strategy and its objectives.
Another way of understanding and assessing a !rm’s strategy can be the analysis of
a single case study of strategy implementation. Some survey participants propose using
!shbone diagrams to analyze the decision-making process and to help identify any
weak points or risks that could emerge from them. In some cases, they believe that this
can help the management anticipate future problems and improve their strategies
accordingly.
Regarding the evaluation ofmanagement as a team, the survey participants also !nd
it dif!cult to design objective ways to evaluate top management’s pro!les and skills.
The majority selects interviews as the prominent evaluation tool, along with, in some
cases, balanced scorecards and performance audits. Only a small percentage is able to
fully articulate how the interviews should be conducted and how to use the results in the
audit process. Some even propose relying on human resources departments to complete
these interviews, without providing speci!c guidelines on how to effectively measure
the convergence between the actual managers’ pro!les or skills and the desired ones.
Few survey participants propose concrete tools like semi-structured or fully
structured questionnaires to identify the actual skills of management. One member of
the management team from the construction sector has argued that:
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[…] to ensure a good communication and a good understanding in our management team, we
have to know the management style of each one of the members. This can be done through the
analysis of the pro!les by an independent consultant.
It is true that the personality of each management team member is important for team
performance. In this way, management can become aware more quickly if an important
new skill set is lacking in their team.
The same logic can be used to identify skills, which would be a more ef!cient way to
distribute tasks among team members. Furthermore, if the management team can
objectively verify what skills are missing compared to the expectations, it would be
much easier to enrich the team by adding new human resources or improving the
existing ones.
However, this approach, according to the respondents, requires the development of
suitable teammember pro!les and an analysis of team competencies as a whole prior to
the performance of the audit. Care should be taken that any necessary actions be viewed
as “positive” actions to coach the actual team in how to better meet expectations, rather
than threats that will endanger team members’ jobs.
As a manager in the media business states:
[…] for me, it is not important who decides for a management audit, what is important is that
total transparency should be established by the auditors and a continuous communication
should be maintained between auditors and auditees.
So we see that it is extremely important that auditors clearly state their goals at the
beginning of an audit and emphasize the importance of improving management
capacities. Furthermore, it is crucial too that team members should be informed of the
audit results and the proposed actions in a timely manner and be allowed to express
their views of them.
5.4 Who can perform a management audit?
We can divide the preferences for the general composition of an audit team into three
groups, internal, external and a mix of both, depending on the level of management
audited.About one-third of our participants have stated that the composition of the team
could be completely internal. According to them, con!dentiality prevails over
independence from management. This position may be explained by the fact that some
of our survey participants viewed the management audit as similar to either a
compliance or performance audit. The secretive culture of the banking sector, in
particular, is probably also a large factor.
About one-quarter of our participants believe that an external audit or consulting
!rm should run themanagement audit, and claim that a guarantee of independence is of
high importance. Independence from the board of directors is considered particularly
important when the audit is done at the board level on behalf of the shareholders. The
same group of participants acknowledges that an internal audit team can perform
management audits, but only at a department level. They also perceive the internal audit
function as inappropriate for strategy and management evaluation because the
personnel of the internal audit function would not have the necessary credentials.
Note that less than one-quarter of our participants consider it possible to use a mixed
team composed of internal and external auditors. This option could be desirable because
it can ensure both the legitimacy inside the !rm with the involvement of internal staff
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and the required competencies of experienced and independent professionals. This
approach would apply mainly to companies that have a strong internal audit function;
however, alternativeswould need to be considered for smaller companies. Amixed team
of company personnel and external consultants was also mentioned, but this would
raise the question of the audit competencies of the company’s personnel.
Regarding public organizations or the public administration, our participants argue
that a management audit should be run by public audit agencies, rather than by private
auditors. The participants who are working in public administrations cited institutions
such as Geneva’s Court of Audit (in French, Cour des Comptes), which is perceived as an
independent agency that has the authority and the competence to audit themanagement
of such organizations.
Finally, there is a consensus among our participants about the requirements for
highly specialized competencies: both soft skills (e.g. interviewing, observing) and hard
skills (technical knowledge of the market and the industry in which the company
operates, knowledge of its key processes) are considered very important to properly
understand a !rm’s strategy. It remains dif!cult to !nd all these competencies to
performmanagement audits at the topmanagement level, but evenmore critically at the
board level. The board would !rst need to be open-minded with regard to its own
evaluation. It would also be necessary to !nd external consultants who are both
specialized in the company’s business and in performing such audits where the human
factor appears to be predominant.
Based on the result developed in the four questions, we have generated research
hypotheses that are presented and discussed in the next section.
6. Discussion and hypotheses generation
Our !ndings outline several reasons for the limited practice of management audits and
the overall negative perception in theGeneva business area. First,management auditing
as a strategic risk-management approach is not well known among executives.
Moreover, the term management audit is often falsely linked with other audit activities
such as compliance, !nancial or corporate governance audits. Also, auditors usually
perceive design and implementation issues as rather delicate matters and as additional
important obstacles to the successful use of management audits. Furthermore, the
management audit implies a set of qualitative techniques for assessing and judging the
management team’s adequacy and performance, which require a very speci!c
methodology and very speci!c skills. Ultimately, there is clearly a technical mis!t
between the after-the-fact approach and characteristics of the traditional audits and the
future-oriented and strategically oriented approach of the management audits.
These !ndings are in line with issues that were brought up in the literature about
management audits. Indeed, although management audits could help identify mistakes
in strategy design and implementation, thus becoming an important part of the
company’s quality improvement process, they are often synonymous with sources of
trouble for departments, divisions or management (Dann et al., 2002). Regarding the
management audit methodology, several authors emphasized the strategic level and
prospective characteristic of this activity, therefore requiring highly specialized skills.
They also underlined the importance of assessing management performance through
the use of speci!c interviewing techniques and qualitative indicators to analyze
management’s composition and skills and their capacity to achieve a company’s
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strategy (Burrowes and Persson, 2000; Craig-Cooper and De Backer, 1993a; Lewington,
1991). Finally, the technical !t argument developed by Ansari et al. (2010) is con!rmed
by our !ndings, in particular the fact that management audit practice does not seem
compatible with the traditional audit techniques already in use by potential adopters.
Concerning the cultural!t deriving from amore sociological perspective (Haxhi et al.,
2010; Sturdy, 2004), we identify two main obstacles to the implementation of this
practice. The !rst concerns the values that are embodied within the practice, as
management audit is often viewed overall as punitive in nature, usually because of the
perception of its results (demoting or !ring managers). This seems to be an important
reason why management audits have not attained the importance we would expect in
the current context of increased corporate governance requirements and strategic risk
management.
The second concernsmore the perception of the power and hierarchy as addressed by
Hofstede’s power distance criteria. In fact, both managers and auditors believe
management audits would not be feasible in Switzerland because of con!dentiality and
the general respect for hierarchy. Apparently, this seems a very important issue for the
participants coming from the banking sector. Furthermore, many of our participants
believe that even broaching the question of a management audit may be a somewhat
dangerous career move. This seems in accordance with Hofstede’s (2001) !ndings
concerning the French-speaking area of Switzerland (Suisse romande), where the power
distance index is high and differs greatly with the German-speaking part. This means
that employees in an organization accept the hierarchical order, which needs less or no
justi!cation at all, with the ideal boss being a benevolent autocrat. In this framework,
the centralization of power becomes popular; thus, challenges to and criticisms of the
existing leadership are very badly received.
As per the political !t, the resource dependencies of the internal audit from the
management and the actual formal power structures seem to play an increasing role in
the adoption of management audits. Several participants, especially those coming from
the auditor population, seem to fear a loss of resources and support from executive
management if they engage in these kinds of audits. As the internal audit serves as a
resource for both the management and the board, it seems the relationship that the
internal audit has with the management in"uences the extent of the work the !rst can
perform over the last. Although the requirements for good corporate governance state
that the internal audit function should report to the board of directors, both the literature
and our results show that this is not systematically the case. Furthermore, internal
auditors often remain under the administrative control of management, which makes it
dif!cult to ensure their independence and freedom of actions in the auditing process.
Before considering the composition of the audit team, the level of management to be
audited needs to be de!ned. Craig-Cooper and De Backer (1993c) proposed a
management audit framework that concentrates on the key executives in each
organizational unit. To ensure independence, impartiality and new perspectives, the use
of an independent party is then recommended, especially for a large-scale review or for
one that is expected to generate controversy (Dann et al., 2002). However, in practice, and
despite the fact that hiring an external consultant is often strongly recommended,
in-house internal audit staff are usually the ones to perform management audits. For
example, Kaiser, a large medical services provider, uses its own internal audit team to
perform board reviews (Overmyer and Purcell, 2010). Questions about technical and
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business competencies and, above all, independence from management remain, and
they are important to work out.
Principles of good corporate governance prescribe that the internal audit function
should report to the board to ensure adequate independence from management
(Joscelyne, 2004). But a PricewaterhouseCoopers survey of 717 internal audit managers
showed that only 31 per cent of respondents were effectively reporting to a board level,
47 per cent were reporting to the chief !nancial of!cer and the remaining 22 per cent
were reporting to the CEO level (PwC, 2007). While the internal audit function could
technically perform management audits of top management and the board of directors,
the results could be systematically challenged because of the lack of independence.
Thus, to guarantee as much independence of the audit team as possible, it is argued that
board reviews or CEO reviews should be performed externally (Dann Hield and Clark,
2002). However, the NACD Survey (NACD, 2010) showed that, while 90 per cent of the
701 respondent companies did proceed to board evaluation, the majority were
self-evaluations. We also found that the vast majority of our participants considered
auditing the board of directors to be very dif!cult. Only a small percentage considered
a management audit that would address the board; the majority preferred to address
only the top- or mid-level management.
In light of these !ndings, we remain convinced that management audits can
contribute to the reduction of the principal-agency problem and to more ef!cient
strategic risk management and that they can ensure an organization’s long-term health
within the overall framework of good corporate governance. The recognition of the
internal auditing role in governance-related activities (IIA, 2011) should lead to more
systematic evaluations of board structures, objectives and dynamics, as well as
management evaluations. Nevertheless, it appears that, despite these positive
enhancements, several other factors in"uence the adoption of this practice. A broader
sociological approach should be adopted to consider different cultural, power and
technical aspects that can foster the adoption or rejection of different corporate
governance good practices. Based on these considerations and on deriving technical,
cultural and political !ndings, we posit three hypotheses (H.). We describe and explain
below each hypothesis to strengthen the link with our !ndings:
H1. The resistance to good corporate governance practices such as management
audits is related to the degree of acceptance of the speci!c tools and skills
requirements of these practices.
Management techniques are essentially grounded on scienti!c management (Fayol and
Taylor). Auditing practices have evolved based on this paradigm. In the of!cial
de!nition of Internal Auditing, for instance (IIA, 2003, p. 13), the auditing approach, is
presented as “systematic and rigorous”, which corresponds to the de!nition of a
scienti!c approach. The goal of scienti!c management is to come up with objective
!ndings. In the case of management audit, there is a paradigm shift, as tools and skills
are of a more qualitative nature. We could thus infer that the resistance to conduct
management audits is related to the nature of tools and skills that are more subjective
than the ones required in classical audits. This !nding is, consequently, related to
current cultural traits of corporations, where objective validation is taken for granted in
every audit process:
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H2. The national culture and the values embodied in the practice in"uence the
resistance to the implementation of good governance practices such as
management audits.
There is abundant literature related to culture and organizational traits paved by
Hofstede’swritings since the 1980s. Hofstede (2001) de!nes culture as “[…] the collective
programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of
people from another”. Hofstede has developed a national culture framework based on
four dimensions (power distance, individualism, uncertainty avoidance and
masculinity) that has been widely applied to explain differences in management
practices between countries. Our survey is based on a sample of Swiss corporations. By
Swiss national culture, we mean traits like “consensus” (Linder and Iff, 2011, p. 2) and
profound respect for hierarchy that are illustrated by the high power distance index
(Hofstede, 2001). As management audits are directly questioning the competency of
executive managers, we can then induce that this is one important reason why there is
such resistance to conduct management audits in Swiss corporations.We can thus infer
that, in a general manner, the national culture can have a deterring effect on the conduct
of management audits on related national corporations:
H3. The use of good governance practices such as management audits is related to
the degree of corporate governance maturity.
The degree of maturity of corporate governance is also an important factor explaining
the conduct of management audits in corporations. This research hypothesis indicates
that a high degree of corporate governance maturity favors the conduct of management
audits. It means that a company with expertise and experience in dealing with board
issues, external and internal auditing roles and functions represents a pre-requisite for
management auditing. As seen in H1, tools and skills for management audits are more
qualitative in nature. So, additionally, we interpret that the corporate governance
structure must be in place even if tools and skills are more classical in nature.
7. Conclusions and future research
While management audits can strengthen the management quality and increase the
monitoring of the company’s strategy and the board’s ef!ciency (Craig-Cooper and De
Backer, 1993c), they are not commonly used or referred to as tools to address corporate
governance. Based on a qualitative research survey in Geneva, we hypothesize that
management audits are not commonly used or referred to as a tool to address corporate
governance for the following three main reasons:
(1) tools and skills needed to conduct management audits are different to the ones
required for conventional audits;
(2) the national culture also plays an important role due to management audits’
notions of hierarchy and authority, as well notions of managerial attitudes; and
(3) without a high corporate governance degree of maturity, corporations’
experience dif!culties in conducting such sophisticated audits.
Our !ndings bridge a gap between the literature on management audits and the
expanding role of the internal audit function. Our study also examines the way
companies – in the Swiss context – understand, perceive and may be ready to apply
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management audits as a good corporate governance practice.We argue that, despite the
positive enhancements and implications that themanagement audits have for corporate
governance, several factors should be considered before applying them. The main
contribution of our work relies on the fact that we are bringing new knowledge about
management audits based on inductive research.
We should insist on the fact that these research hypotheses need to be validated in
subsequent research using quantitative surveys. Therefore, the lack of validation of our
hypotheses is the main limitation of our work. Further research should include a survey
on management and auditors’ perceptions of good corporate governance to con!rm
these exploratory results.
We also provide practical managerial recommendations based on our !ndings.
Compared to either !nancial or compliance audits, management audits are
fundamentally based on anticipation rather than detection. As a consequence, speci!c
techniques as well as skills need to be developed to assess both the completion of
strategic objectives and the behavior of management. Interviews and observation
techniques should be used far more, as these audits are more qualitative and
participative than traditional audits and have to be tailor-made by industry and
company. Our !ndings indicate that the management audit embodied values that tend
to engender mixed feelings of interest and fear, as they are too often associated with
punitive actions during company crises. As a consequence, there is a clear need to
improve the image of management auditing in the corporate world. Furthermore, the
cultural aspect linked with the hierarchy and power seems very important in the
acceptance of corporate governance practices. The national power distance index could
be a starting point for assessing the potential perceptions of the actors in adopting good
governance practices. In addition, considering the formal power structure in a more
political perspective, whilemanagement audits could be performed by the internal audit
function, a company’s organizational structure and reporting lines tend to hinder, or
even prevent, the required capacity of action of internal auditors. New corporate
governance schemesmust then be explored and designed, such as relying on specialized
and independent !rms that could be mandated by the internal auditing department to
circumvent this political bias.
Our work on the Geneva area case suggests that the diffusion of management audit
practices is not solely related to business or national culture barriers but also andmainly
to the degree of corporate governance maturity. Corporate governance has been at the
heart of economic debates in Switzerland over the past 10 years, but while Swiss SMI
companies have been evolving toward internationally recognized good practices of
corporate governance, this evolution remains at an initial stage in many companies and
banks. Therefore, the internal audit function that appears as a reasonable candidate to
foster the development of management audits and occupies a more strategic position
within companies in the context of growing corporate governance requirements is not
yet in the position to carry out such audits. Notwithstanding the limitations due to the
nature and extent of our study, our !ndings could be interesting for an international
audience because they indicate possible action points to be leveraged by boards of
directors to carry out management audits that have mainly been imported from North
American, Australian and UK contexts in other national realities with other cultural
considerations and beliefs. They should pay attention to the degree of maturity of
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corporate governance within the country and to how power balances could hamper the
diffusion of management audits or other good governance practices.
All these elements show that there is a wide scope for further research about
management auditing. Although the Geneva area !ndings may not be applicable to
other developing or advanced countries because cultural traits and corporate
governance rules are context-based, there would be a need to conduct similar surveys in
different contexts (regional, national and industrial) to generalize such !ndings.
Future research could more speci!cally address the following issues: the
contribution of management audits in reducing the agency problem, the value added of
management audits to companies’ performance and the contribution of management
audits in monitoring strategic risks. Finally, the question of relationships between the
internal audit function, the management and the board, as well as the question of
independence of the internal auditors in performing management audits, remains an
interesting and understudied area.
References
Anhorn, R. and Meier, P. (2012), “Hedge funds in Switzerland: structure, development, outlook”,
ZHAW, Zurich University of Applied Sciences, p. 50, available at: http://sml.zhaw.ch/
!leadmin/user_upload/management/zai/forschung/pdf/ZHAW_Hedge_Fund_Survey_
2012_September.pdf (accessed December 2014).
Ansari, S.M., Fiss, P.C. and Zajac, E.J. (2010), “Made to !t: how practices vary as they diffuse”,
Academy of Management Review, Vol. 35 No. 1, pp. 67-92.
Baden, E.J. (1968), “Management audit”, The Accountant’s Magazine, October, pp. 520-529.
Baker, H.K. (Ed.) (2010), Corporate Governance: A Synthesis of Theory, Research, and Practice,
Wiley, Hoboken, NJ.
Balkaran, L.A.L. (2008), “Two sides of auditing”, Internal Auditor, Vol. 65 No. 5, pp. 21-23.
Banker, R.D., Gordon, P. and Srinivasan, D. (2000), “An empirical investigation of an incentive
plan that includes non !nancial performance measures”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 75
No. 1, pp. 65-92.
Beasley, M.S., Carcello, J.V., Hermanson, D.R. and Lapides, P.D. (2000), “Fraudulent !nancial
reporting: consideration of industry traits and corporate governance mechanisms”,
Accounting Horizons, Vol. 14 No. 4, pp. 441-454.
Benedict, H.G. (1948), Yardsticks of Management, Harper & Bros, New York, NY.
Benson, D. and Hughes, J.A. (Eds) (1983), The Perspective of Ethno Methodology, Longman,
London; New York, NY.
Bishop, D. (1974), “Management and operations auditing”, The Accountant, Vol. 56 No. 3,
pp. 262-264.
Brown, I., Steen, A. and Foreman, J. (2009), “Risk management in corporate governance: a review
and proposal”, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 17 No. 5, pp. 546-558.
Buchanan, D. and Badham, R. (1999), Power, Politics, and Organizational Change: Winning the
Turf Game, Sage Publications, London.
Burrowes, A. and Persson, M. (2000), “The Swedish management audit: a precedent for
performance and value for money audits”, Managerial Auditing Journal, Vol. 15 No. 3,
pp. 85-96.
Burton, J.C. and Fair!eld, P. (1982), “Auditing evolution in a changing environment”, Auditing,
Vol. 1 No. 2, pp. 1-22.
807
Management
audit as a tool
Do
wn
loa
de
d b
y H
au
te 
Ec
ole
 Sp
ec
ial
ise
e d
e S
uis
se 
Oc
cid
en
tal
e A
t 2
3:0
1 0
1 O
cto
be
r 2
01
5 (
PT
)
Clark, M.W., Gibbs, T.E. and Schroeder, R.G. (1981), “How CPAs evaluate internal auditors”, The
CPA Journal (pre-1986), Vol. 51 No. 7, p. 10.
Craig-Cooper, M. and De Backer, P.D. (1993a), “Management audit methodology”, The
Management Audit: How to Create an Effective Management Team, Financial Times
Pitman Publishing, London, pp. 67-97.
Craig-Cooper, M. and De Backer, P.D. (1993b), “Management audit: a vital management tool”,The
Management Audit: How to Create an Effective Management Team, Financial Times
Pitman Publishing, London, pp. 43-55.
Craig-Cooper, M. and De Backer, P.D. (1993c),TheManagement Audit: How to Create an Effective
Management Team, Financial Times Pitman Publishing, London.
Dann Hield,W. and Clark, D. (2002), “Management audits: passe, or a useful quality improvement
tool?”, PM. Public Management, Vol. 84 No. 4, pp. 6-10.
Eccles, R.G. and Pyburn, P.J. (1992), “Creating a comprehensive system to measure performance”,
Management Accounting, Vol. 74 No. 4, p. 41.
Fama, E.F. (1980), “Agency problems and the theory of the !rm”, Journal of Political Economy,
Vol. 88 No. 2, pp. 288-307.
Fama, E.F. and Jensen, M.C. (1983), “Separation of ownership and control”, Journal of Law &
Economics, Vol. 26 No. 2, pp. 301-326.
Fligstein, N. (1996), “Markets as politics: a political-cultural approach to market institutions”,
American Sociological Review, Vol. 61 No. 4, pp. 656-673.
Freeman, R.E. (Ed.) (1984), Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach, Pitman, Boston;
London.
FSA (2011), “The failure of the Royal Bank of Scotland: Financial Services Authority Board
report”, London FSA, p. 26, available at: www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/rbs.pdf (accessed
March 2012).
Gar!nkel, H. (Ed.) (2008), Studies in Ethnomethodology, Polity Press, Cambridge.
Gephart, R.P. Jr. (1993), “The textual approach: risk and blame in disaster sense making”,
Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 36 No. 6, p. 1465.
Glynn, J.J. (1987), “Value-for-money auditing: conceptual, development, and operational issues
(Book Review)”, Accounting & Business Research, Vol. 17 No. 68, pp. 382-383.
Goodwin-Stewart, J. and Kent, P. (2006), “The use of internal audit by Australian companies”,
Managerial Auditing Journal, Vol. 21 No. 1, pp. 81-101.
Goold, M. and Quinn, J.J. (1990), “The paradox of strategic controls”, Strategic Management
Journal (1986-1998), Vol. 11 No. 1, p. 43.
Govindarajan, V. (1989), “Implementing competitive strategies at the business unit level:
implications of matching managers to strategies”, Strategic Management Journal
(1986-1998), Vol. 10 No. 3, p. 251.
Gramling, A.A.,Maletta,M.J., Schneider, A. and Church, B.K. (2004), “The role of the internal audit
function in corporate governance: a synthesis of the extant internal auditing literature and
directions for future research”, Journal of Accounting Literature, Vol. 23 No. 1, p. 194.
Guillén, M. (1994),Models of Management: Work, Authority, and Organization in a Comparative
Perspective, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.
Hass, S., Abdolmohammadi, M.J. and Burnaby, P. (2006), “The Americas literature review on
internal auditing”,Managerial Auditing Journal, Vol. 21 No. 8, pp. 835-844.
Haxhi, I. and Van Ees, H. (2010), “Explaining diversity in the worldwide diffusion of codes of good
governance”, Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 41 No. 4, pp. 710-726.
MAJ
30,8/9
808
Do
wn
loa
de
d b
y H
au
te 
Ec
ole
 Sp
ec
ial
ise
e d
e S
uis
se 
Oc
cid
en
tal
e A
t 2
3:0
1 0
1 O
cto
be
r 2
01
5 (
PT
)
Heap, J. (1976), “What are sense making practices?”, Sociological Inquiry, Vol. 46 No. 2, p. 107-115.
Hofstede, G. (1997), Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind, McGraw-Hill, London.
Hofstede, G. (2001), Culture’s Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions and
Organizations Across Nations, 2nd ed., Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA.
Hyland, M.M. and Verrault, D.A. (2003), “Developing a strategic internal audit-human resource
management relationship: a model survey”,Managerial Auditing Journal, Vol. 18 Nos 6/7,
pp. 465-477.
IIA (1999), A Vision for the Future: Professional Practices Framework for Internal Auditing, The
Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation, Altamonte Springs, FL.
IIA (2003), Internal Auditing’s Systematic, Disciplined Process, The Institute of Internal Auditors
Research Foundation, Altamonte Springs, FL.
IIA (2004), The Professional Practices Framework, The Institute of Internal Auditors Research
Foundation, Altamonte Springs, FL.
IIA (2006), Position Paper on Organisational Governance: Guidance for Internal Auditors, The
Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation, Altamonte Springs, FL, p. 18.
IIA (2011), “What’s next for internal auditing?”, The IIA’s Global Internal Audit Survey: A
Component of the CBOK Study, The Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation,
Altamonte Springs, FL, p. 99.
IIA (2012), International Standard for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing (Standards),
The Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation, Altamonte Springs, FL.
IIA (2013), Position Paper, The Three Lines of Defense in Effective RiskManagement and Control,
The Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation, Altamonte Springs, FL.
Innes, J. (1990), “External management auditing of companies: a survey of bankers”, Accounting,
Auditing & Accountability Journal, Vol. 3 No. 1, pp. 18-37.
Innes, J. and Lyon, R. (1994), “A simulated lending decision with external management audit”,
Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Vol. 7 No. 4, pp. 73-73.
Johl, S.K., Kaur, S., Subramaniam, N. and Cooper, B. (2013), “Internal audit function, board quality
and !nancial reporting quality evidence from Malaysia”, Managerial Auditing Journal,
Vol. 28 No. 9, pp. 780-814.
Joscelyne, J.G. (2004), “Balancing relationships”, The Internal Auditor, Vol. 61 No. 1, pp. 35-36.
Kaplan, R.S. and Norton, D.P. (1996), “Linking the balanced scorecard to strategy”, California
Management Review, Vol. 39 No. 1, pp. 53-79.
Kirkpatrick, G. (2009), “Corporate governance lessons from the !nancial crisis”, OECD Journal:
Financial Market Trends, Vol. 4 No. 1, pp. 61-87.
Krogstad, J.L., Ridley, A.J. and Rittenberg, L.E. (1999), “Where we’re going”,The Internal Auditor,
Vol. 56 No. 5, pp. 26-33.
Leung, P., Cooper, B. and Perera, L. (2011), “Accountability structures and management
relationships of internal audit”,Managerial Auditing Journal, Vol. 26 No. 9, pp. 794-816.
Lewington, D. (1991), “Auditing top management”,Managerial Auditing Journal, Vol. 6 No. 4.
Linder,W. and Iff, A. (2011), “Swiss political system”, FDFA, p. 65, available at: www.wolf-linder.
ch/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/Swiss-political-system.pdf (accessed November 2014).
Mamman, A. (2002), “The adoption and modi!cation of management ideas in organizations:
towards an analytical framework”, Strategic Change, Vol. 11 No. 7, pp. 379-389.
Melville, R. (2003), “The contribution internal auditors make to strategic management”,
International Journal of Auditing, Vol. 7 No. 3, pp. 209-222.
809
Management
audit as a tool
Do
wn
loa
de
d b
y H
au
te 
Ec
ole
 Sp
ec
ial
ise
e d
e S
uis
se 
Oc
cid
en
tal
e A
t 2
3:0
1 0
1 O
cto
be
r 2
01
5 (
PT
)
NACD (Ed.) (2010), Public Company Governance Survey, NACD, Washington, DC.
OCSTAT (2013), “Statistiques cantonales, Les 21 domaines: 12. Monnaie, banques, assurances”,
available at: www.ge.ch/statistique/domaines/12/12_04/tableaux.asp (accessed November
2014).
OECD (2004), Principles of Corporate Governance, OECDE, Paris, p. 66.
Oliver, C. (1992), “The antecedents of deinstitutionalization”, Organization Studies, Vol. 13 No. 4,
pp. 563-588.
Overmyer, C. and Purcell, N. (2010), “The quiet revolution: Kaiser’s internal audit expands
governance role”, Directorship, Vol. 36 No. 5, pp. 44-47.
Parker, L.D. and Foundation, A.A.R. (1986), Value-for-Money Auditing: Conceptual, Development
and Operational Issues, Australian Accounting Research Foundation, Caul!eld, p. 92.
Pickett, K.H.S. and Pickett, J.M. (Eds) (2010), The Internal Auditing Handbook, Wiley, New York,
NY.
Power, M. (2005), “The invention of operational risk”, Review of International Political Economy,
Vol. 12 No. 4, pp. 577-599.
Power,M. (Ed.) (2002),TheAudit Society: Rituals of Veri!cation, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
PwC (2006), PricewaterhouseCoopers’ State of the Internal Audit Profession: Internal Audit Post
Sarbanes-Oxley, New York, NY, p. 27.
PwC (2007), “State of the internal audit profession study: pressures build for continual focus on
risk”, available at: www.pwc.com/en_US/us/internal-audit/assets/state_internal_audit_
profession_study_07.pdf
PwC (2014), “State of the internal audit profession study: higher performance by design: a blue
print for change”, available at: www.pwc.com/en/services/assurance/internal_audit/ state
of the internal audit profession study 14.pdf
Rezaee, Z. (2010), “Board subcommittees for corporate governance”, In Corporate Governance: A
Synthesis.
Richardson, V.J. (2000), “Information asymmetry and earnings management: some evidence”,
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Vol. 15 No. 4, pp. 325-347.
Robertson, J.C. and Clarke, R.W. (1971), “Veri!cation of management representations: a !rst step
toward independent audits of management”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 46 No. 3,
pp. 562-571.
Rogers, E. (1995), Diffusion of Innovations, 4th ed., Free Press, New York, NY.
Rose, T.G. (1944), The Management Audit: Based on A Paper Read before the Institute of
Industrial Administration, 2nd ed., Gee & Co, London.
SanMiguel, J.G. and Govindarajan, V. (1984), “The contingent relationship between the controller
and internal audit functions in large organizations”, Accounting, Organizations, and
Society, Vol. 9 No. 2, pp. 179-188.
Selim, G.M., Sudarsanam, S. and Lavine, M. (2003), “The role of internal auditors in mergers,
acquisitions and divestitures: an international study”, International Journal of Auditing,
Vol. 7 No. 3, pp. 223-245.
Selim, M.G. and McNamee, D. (1998), Risk Management: Changing the Internal Auditor’s
Paradigm, The IIA Research Foundation, Altamonte Springs, FL.
Sneller, L. and Langendijk, H. (2007), “Sarbanes Oxley section 404 costs of compliance: a case
study”, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 15 No. 2, p. 101.
Sturdy, A. (2004), “The adoption of management ideas and practices: theoretical perspectives and
possibilities”,Management Learning, Vol. 35 No. 2, pp. 155-179.
MAJ
30,8/9
810
Do
wn
loa
de
d b
y H
au
te 
Ec
ole
 Sp
ec
ial
ise
e d
e S
uis
se 
Oc
cid
en
tal
e A
t 2
3:0
1 0
1 O
cto
be
r 2
01
5 (
PT
)
Wright, D. (1996),Evidence on the Relation Between Corporate Governance Characteristics and the
Quality of Financial Reporting, Rochester.
Wright,M. (Ed.) (2013),TheOxfordHandbook of Corporate Governance, OxfordUniversity Press,
New York, NY.
Further reading
Gleim, I.N. and Irwin, G.M. (Eds) (2004), Internal Audit’s Role in Governance, Risk, and Control,
Gleim Publications, Gainesville.
Corresponding author
Nathalie Brender can be contacted at: nathalie.brender@hesge.ch
For instructions on how to order reprints of this article, please visit our website:
www.emeraldgrouppublishing.com/licensing/reprints.htm
Or contact us for further details: permissions@emeraldinsight.com
811
Management
audit as a tool
Do
wn
loa
de
d b
y H
au
te 
Ec
ole
 Sp
ec
ial
ise
e d
e S
uis
se 
Oc
cid
en
tal
e A
t 2
3:0
1 0
1 O
cto
be
r 2
01
5 (
PT
)
